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Abstract
In this paper we implement a non-dynamic panel threshold model for fifty U.S. states
to better understand the factors determining changes in Okun’s Law. We test for
asymmetries in Okun’s Law controlling for changes in industry employment. We find
changes in output on unemployment are least sensitive for states with relatively large
employment within government, construction, and natural resources sectors and
lower employment levels in financial, professional and business services and
manufacturing sectors. States with lower manufacturing employment have a less
sensitive output to unemployment relationship, but the reverse does not apply. States
with larger shares of employment within manufacturing sectors do not have a
significantly more sensitive relationship compared to the national average.
JEL Codes: E3; R1; J6
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1 Introduction
Okun (1962) first documented the long standing relationship between output and unem-
ployment. Today most macroeconomic textbooks state for every one-percent decrease in
output will cause unemployment to increase by one-third to one-half percent.1 Okun’s
Law is often referred to as a three-to-one or two-to-one relationship. Today many
researchers are using Okun’s Law to better understand the dynamics surrounding the
recovery following the financial crisis. In particular a large debate has centered around
whether the United States is currently experiencing a “jobless recovery”. According to the
Congressional Budget Office, following the start of the Great Recession in 2009 the reces-
sionary gap peaked at -7.5% of potential GDP and by the end of 2012 improved to -5.7%.
Prior to the Great Recession the natural rate of unemployment was estimated at 4.8%,
assuming Okun’s Law held we would have expected actual unemployment to reach 8.4%.2
The actual unemployment rate was significantly higher and peaked at 10% in October
of 2009. Does the divergence in Okun’s Law necessary imply a permanent change in the
output, unemployment relationship?
Daly and Hobijn (2010) find strong labor productivity growth allowed firms to lay-
off a large numbers of workers while holding output relatively steady, this resulted in a
more sensitive relationship between output and unemployment.3 The authors show the
productivity gains, especially in manufacturing, have resulted in a nearly one for one
relationship between deviations in output and unemployment. Following the results of
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Daly we expect states with a larger share of employment in sectors combined with strong
productivity growth to have a higher Okun’s coefficient (i.e. a more sensitive relationship).
Gordon (2010) breakdowns Okun’s Law to measure how productivity and aggre-
gate hours respond to cyclical fluctuations over time. The authors find the response
in aggregate hours has increased after 1986 but productivity has decreased. The latter
result carries particular importance as the authors find productivity no longer exhibits
pro-cyclical fluctuations. The authors contribute the shift to increases in immigra-
tion, imports, and medical care costs and a decline in real wages and labor market
protections.
Owyang and Sekhposyan (2012) analyzes Okun’s Law over time with attention on the
Great Recession. They find Okun’s Law differs when comparing across the business cycle.
During normal times they find the correlation between real output and unemployment
to be approximately -0.4 but strengthens to -0.55 during recessions. Cazes et al. (2013)
use Okun’s Law to analyze the deviations in unemployment rates following the global
financial crisis. They find for most countries Okun’s coefficient increased sharply but for
Germany and Netherlands there was a dramatic decrease over the short term. They find
countries with a greater level of employment protection legislation experienced a smaller
response in unemployment to changes in the business cycle. This was particularly true
for Germany. Ball et al. (2013) analyzes Okun’s Law in twenty advanced economies since
1980. They find the relationship does vary substantial across countries but do not find
evidence of a “jobless recovery”. The authors find considerable differences across the
countries which they contribute to idiosyncratic features of national labor markets, but
not differences in employment protection legislation.
We add to the existing literature by explaining departures in Okun’s Law through a
regime switching model controlling for varying measures of industry employment levels.
We implement a non-dynamic panel threshold model introduced by Hansen (1999) to a
panel of fifty states from 1990 through 2012. The motive behind our paper is relatively
straight forward. Ball et al. (2013) claim differences in Okun’s Law across countries are
contributed to idiosyncratic features of national labor markets. Whereas others claim the
departure in Okun’s Law is from labor market protections (Gordon (2010)) and produc-
tivity gains (Daly and Hobijn (2010)). We believe industry composition can explain the
idiosyncratic component as well as productivity shocks. For example, we expect states
with relatively large employment shares within manufacturing sectors to have a more
sensitive relationship. Strong productivity growth and fewer labor market protections
make manufacturing employment more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations. In addition to
manufacturing, states with relatively large employment within service (financial, profes-
sional, and business) areas will also have a more sensitive relationship. We expect states
with larger employment within government and education sectors to have a relatively
insensitive relationship. Some sectors are more vulnerable to layoffs during an economic
downturn and can increasing hiring during an expansion at a faster rate.
Grouping states by industry structure will capture a more precise measure of Okun’s
Law when compared to estimating the relationship across states. Stefano et al. (2013)
show that states with similar industry structures are more likely to have a synchronized
business cycle. Implicitly, grouping by industry structure assumes both productivity and
demand shocks will show up through employment levels within each industry, inde-
pendent of state borders. If a state has implemented a particular policy, i.e. changes in
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minimum wages or personal income taxes, this would only affect the state in question
in the short run. Under the assumption of perfect labor mobility workers will move
into states that offer employment in their sectors. Given the large literature on business
cycle synchronization and the robust finding of regional business cycles we believe using
panel data procedure pooling on employment levels to be an important extension in
understanding changes in Okun’s Law.
The threshold modeling procedure uses underlying variables (i.e. industry employment
levels) to find the optimal breakpoint. We find Okun’s coefficient is lowest (in absolute
value) for states with relatively greater employment within government, construction,
and natural resource sectors and lower employment in financial, professional and busi-
ness services, and manufacturing sectors. In other words, states with larger employment
shares within government sectors experience a smaller response in unemployment to
changes in output. Whereas, states heavily dependent on financial and professional ser-
vices and manufacturing employment have a more sensitive relationship. Further we
include a lagged dummy variable to measure the impact on unemployment rates in the
eight quarters immediately following a recession. We find states with a smaller share
of government employment have significantly higher unemployment rates than states
with a larger share of government workers. After eight quarters following a recession
states with a relatively larger share of professional service, financial services, construction,
and government employment were likely to have lower unemployment rates. Addition-
ally, states with a smaller share of employment in natural resources and manufacturing
had significantly lower unemployment rates in the eight quarters following the end of a
recession.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short overview of
Okun’s Law, discusses some key issues estimating the relationship, and provides a brief
review of the literature. Section 3 reviews the data construction for state level estimation
of output and employment shares and outlines the threshold estimation process. Section 4
reviews the baseline results. Section 5 goes through the threshold results by employment
sector. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Okun’s Law
Okun’s original paper analyzes the regression between the changes in the log of real gross
national product (RGNP) and the unemployment rate. To estimate this relationship Okun
regressed the quarterly change in the log of RGNP on the change in unemployment from
1947q1 to 1960q4:
ut = αd + βdyt + et (1)
where ut is the unemployment rate and yt is the log of RGNP. Okun first found α̂ = 0.3
and β̂ = −0.3. The interpretation for β̂ is a one-percent decrease in the RGNP growth
rate will cause unemployment to increase by 0.3 percent, or a three-to-one relationship
between changes in output and the unemployment rate. Over time the relationship has
slowly shifted into the two-to-one relationship which is commonly reported in textbooks.
Throughout this paper we will refer to Equation 1 as the difference specification
(denoted by d in Equation 1). Okun also estimated a level specification:
ut = u∗l + βl(yt − y∗t ) + et (2)
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where the constant term, u∗l , measures the natural rate of unemployment and (yt − y∗t )
is the output gap. Okun assumes potential output, y∗t , follows a 3.5 percent trend line.
Later studies have reliedmore on time-series filteringmeasures to decompose output into
trend and cyclical components. Okun finds u∗t = 3.72 and βl = −0.36. These results are
consistent with his findings of a three-to-one relationship estimated in Equation 1. For
our purpose, Equation 2 will be denoted as the level specification which is denoted by l in
Equation 2.
A number of papers have analyzed Okun’s Law in a country specific framework. For
the United States Knotek II (2007) analyzes changes in Okun’s coefficient in conjunction
with changes in the business cycle. He finds the output-unemployment relationship to
be less sensitive (i.e. the coefficient is smaller in absolute value) during expansions but
significantly more sensitive during recessions. He also finds evidence that the contem-
poraneous correlation has decreased over time, but correlation between unemployment
lagged growth rates has increased. Herzog (2013) is the first to estimate Okun’s Law across
states. They find considerable differences in Okun’s coefficient which they link to voter
preferences. Cuaresma (2003) estimates Okun’s Law in a regime-dependent specification
that allows for an asymmetric effect of output growth on unemployment. Essentially, we
are using a similar approach for a panel of states that allows for asymmetric effects within
industry employment levels.
There have been a number of studies that have analyzed Okun’s Law across regions
using panel data specifications. Maza and Villaverde (2007) and Villaverde and Maza
(2009) analyze Okun’s Law across Spanish regions. The authors find the inverse re-
lationship between unemployment and output remains but the coefficients range
from -0.80 to -0.95 which are three times lower than Okun’s original estimates. This
suggests a more sensitive relationship between output and unemployment. Marieestelle
and Facchini (2013) finds Okun’s Law holds for fourteen French regions but break-
downs for eight regions and identifies regional factors to explain the disparities. Huang
and Yeh (2013) use a pooled mean group estimator that allows the authors to esti-
mate the short- and long-run relationship across countries and states. The authors find
unemployment and output are cointegrated and the unemployment-output linkages are
negative and significant across both dimensions. In addition to papers focusing directly
on cross regional differences, a number of researchers have explored Okun’s Law across
larger regional blocks. Fouquau (2008) uses a non-dynamic panel threshold model to
test the relationship among 20 OECD countries. The authors find evidence support-
ing a nonlinear relationship with four specific regimes tied to varying levels of cyclical
unemployment where the coefficient displays the most sensitivity at the lowest and high-
est levels of cyclical unemployment. Harris and Silverstone (2001) estimates Okun’s Law
across seven OECD countries testing for asymmetry in the relationship. The authors find
failing to correct the asymmetries across the business cycle will result in a rejection of
Okun’s Law.
It has been well documented that Okun’s coefficient varies across business cycles
and displays a nonlinear relationship across varying levels of unemployment and out-
put growth. The work of Long and Plosser (1987) and Jimeno (1992) show sectoral-
specific shocks tend to dominate and only impact the aggregate economy with a lag.
Recently, Foerster et al. (2011) show the importance of sectoral shocks have more
than doubled in importance explaining the variation in industrial production since the
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Great Moderation. Given the importance of sectoral specific shocks using sector spe-
cific employment levels will provide us with a more reflective and useful measure of
Okun’s Law.
3 Empirical models and data
In our analysis we primarily focus on the non-dynamic specification, i.e. Equation 2, using
quarterly data from 1990 through 2012 for the fifty states. Employment data by industry
was not collected until 1990 which limits us to 23 years of observations. Nonetheless,
Starting in 1990 will allow us to capture the dynamics over two complete business cycles
plus the recovery from the Great Recession.
The biggest challenge when estimating Equation 2 at the state level is constructing
an appropriate measure of real GDP and potential output. At the state level, real gross
domestic product is produced on an annual frequency. Total personal income is the only
variable captured on a quarterly frequency. The challenge in using total personal income
occurs when converting the variable to real income. The Bureau of Labor Statistics does
not produce inflation measures by state but by large metropolitan statistical areas and
geographical regions. Instead of attempting to find an appropriate conversion of total
personal income for each state we use the economic coincident index produced by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, created by Stock and Watson (1989), and applied
to states by Crone and Clayton-Matthews (2005). The economic coincident index is
produced on a monthly frequency and is constructed to follow the trend for each
state’s real gross product. The long-term growth rate of the coincident index will match
the long-term growth of real gross state product. Using the state index allows us to
capture the cyclical variation on a higher frequency but maintains the same long-
term growth for each state and provides an accurate measure of state level output
gaps.
The employment measures are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data for the unem-
ployment rate are obtained from the Labor Force Statistics produced in the Current
Population Survey (CPS). The data for employment by sector are from the Current
Employment Statistics (CES) database for State and Area Employment, Hours, and Earn-
ings. We include data from 9 unique sectors plus the employment to population ratio.
The industries we use are construction; manufacturing; trade, transportation, and utilities
(trade); natural resources (natural); financial activities (financial); professional and busi-
ness services (services); education and health services (education); leisure and hospitality
(leisure); and government.
3.1 Estimating the output gap
We estimate the output gap through two different methods. First we obtain the output
gap by regressing the log of the coincident indicators on a constant, trend, and quadratic
trend for each country independently:
Log(CI)t = β0 + β1Trend + β2Trend2 + ut (3)
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Second, we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to estimate the trend and cyclical com-




( yt − τt)2 + λ
T∑
t=1
((τt+1 − τt) − (τt − τt−1))2 (4)
where λ is referred to as the smoothing parameter. A greater value for λ results in the
trend being more linear, all else equal. We use λ = 1, 600 which is common for quarterly
data.4 We elect to use the filter to estimate potential output and not the natural rate of
unemployment. Instead, we estimate the natural rate of unemployment as the constant in
Equation 2. This approach follows Owyang and Sekhposyan (2012).
One concern with the HP filter centers around estimating the end of sample trend. The
HP filter exaggerates the change in the trend at the end of sample. In fact, under both
smoothing parameters we find the average growth rate for potential output following the
Great Recession to be less than 1%. Following Ball et al. (2013) we alleviate this concern
by extrapolating the estimated trend from 2004 to 2007 forward through 2012. Averaged
across states this gives us a trend growth rate of approximately 2.5% which mirrors the
national growth of potential real GDP estimated by the CBO.5
3.2 Employment data
Although the employment measures do not directly enter the regression estimation, but
serve as a sorting variable for creating the threshold break points, it is important to
accurately construct the employment ratios. An ideal employment measure for the nine
sectors of interest (government, financial services, professional and business services,
construction, natural resources, manufacturing, education and health services, leisure
and hospitality, and trade, transportation, and utilities) would be the employment within
each sector relative to the working age population for each state. Unfortunately data are
not readily available for the latter. This leaves us with choosing between the state labor
force and total population for each state. We estimate the models using both measures,
but primarily focus our results in this paper on the sector employment to state popula-
tion ratio. We chose total population over labor force to help control for states impacted
by the discouraged worker effect.
Suppose a state had a relatively large share of employment in manufacturing sectors
which during the last decade has been in steady decline. Many workers unemployed in
manufacturing have shifted into the discouraged worker category. Using total employ-
ment in manufacturing relative to the labor force will understate the decline in the
manufacturing share relative to other sectors. Using the employment to population ratio
will accurately reflect the decrease in manufacturing employment. This issue is magnified
when comparing across states. States with a relatively large discouraged worker effect may
have employment to labor force ratios increase even if employment is decreasing in a par-
ticular sector (assuming a relatively large discouraged worker effect leading to a decrease
in the labor force).
One drawback of using the state population emerges when states have a large depen-
dency ratio which could result from a relatively large population under the age of twenty
or older than 65. This is a particular concern for Arizona and Florida, two states with
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3.3 Threshold estimation
Hansen’s non-dynamic threshold procedure has been applied in many different areas.
Hansen originally applied the procedure to test whether financial constraints affect
investment decisions. More recently the procedure has been applied in saving-investment
literature by testing for thresholds in country size (see Ho (2003)). Cecchetti et al. (2011)
applied the procedure to test for thresholds in the effects of increased government debt
on economic growth. Aghion et al. (2009) use the procedure to test for the existence
of thresholds in saving rates within a standard growth regression. The non-dynamic
threshold procedure does have some attractive features in that the optimal thresholds are
estimated through a least squares estimator. But the statistical inference is only applicable
to balanced panels without a dynamic component. Fortunately our data and Equation 2
fits into this class of models.
The single threshold procedure requires comparing the residual sum of squares from
the restricted regression, Equation (2), to the unrestricted regression which allows for a
single threshold:
ut = u∗i,t + β0(yi,t − y∗i,t)I(qi,t ≤ γ ) + β1(yi,t − y∗i,t)I(qit > γ ) + eit (5)
where qit is the scalar threshold variable (sector specific employment ratios), and I(·)
is the indicator function that takes a value of one when the threshold condition in the
bracket is satisfied, zero otherwise. The error term is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed with mean zero and finite variance σ 2. Mean deviations are taken
to control for country specific effects measured by μi.
Following Hansen’s recommendation, the threshold sample is trimmed by 10 percent
of the highest and lowest values.6 Trimming assures adequate observations within each
threshold regime. For our sample, N = 4450, which restricts each regime to have at least
450 quarterly observations. Restricting the threshold regime size to be at least ten-percent
of the total observations helps to minimize potential bias caused by single state outliers.
Next the optimal threshold value is selected to minimize the residual sum of squares.
After selecting the optimal threshold value, γ1, it is important to determine if a threshold
effect is statistically significant. The null hypothesis of no threshold effect is:
H0 : β0 = β1,
where β0 = β1 is tested by a likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio test for the first
stage threshold estimate is:
F1 = S0 − S1(γˆ1)
σˆ 2
(6)
where σˆ 2 = 1n(T−1)S1(γˆ1), S0 are the residual sum of squares from the restricted regres-
sion, S1(γˆ1) are the residual sum of squares from the unrestricted regression, and γˆ1 is the
threshold parameter that minimizes the residual sum of squares. The null hypothesis is
rejected for large values of the likelihood ratio. Once the single threshold is estimated the
process of estimation extends easily to models with two and three thresholds breaks.
Second, when estimating the second threshold we adopt a sequential estimation proce-
dure following Bai (1999). If the first threshold is significant we proceed into estimating
all possible combinations for a double threshold model. Hansen assumes the original
threshold value is fixed while estimating the second threshold. If there is evidence of a
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second threshold then he proceeds to reestimate the first threshold. The primary rea-
son for choosing the latter approach concerns computing time.7 Given the relatively large
data set we elect to still use the sequential estimation procedure but adopt Hansen’s rec-
ommendation of using the grid 10.00%, 10.25%, 10.50%, 10.75%....89.25%, 89.50%, 88.75%,
89.00% to minimize over number of quantiles estimated.
To determine the second threshold break, the following model is estimated:
ut = u∗i,t + μi + β0(yi,t − y∗i,t)I(qit ≤ γ1) + β1(yi,t − y∗i,t)I(γ1 < qit ≤ γ2)
+ β2(yi,t − y∗i,t)I(γ2 < qit) + eit (7)
Assuming the first threshold is given, the optimal second-stage threshold estimate is
found by minimizing the residual sum of squares for Equation 7. The likelihood ratio test
of one versus two thresholds is be based on the statistic:
F2 = S1(γˆ1) − S2(γˆ2)
σˆ 2
(8)
where σˆ 2 = S2(γˆ2)/n(T − 1). The null hypothesis of β0 = β1 = β2 is rejected for large
values F2. The asymptotic distributions for F1 and F2 are non-standard. Under the null
hypothesis the thresholds are not identified, Hansen suggests a bootstrapping procedure
to simulate the asymptotic distribution and p-values for the likelihood ratio test.8
4 Data and results
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of key summary statistics. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution for each employment sector where the values are expressed as the total number
of people employed in that sector relative to the state population. For comparison we
also present the distribution for the total employment to population ratio. The two
sectors with the largest share of employment, on average, are government services and
trade, transportation, and utilities. The threshold procedure works best if there is consid-
erable variability across the threshold variable. Comparing values between the 10th and
90th percentiles we can see that for most sectors the 90th percentile is nearly twice as
large as the tenth percentile. This provides us with ample variability to use the threshold
procedure.
Table 2 presents the means by state across the nine sectors and the total employ-
ment to population ratio. This table also shows the variability across states. For example,
employment within the manufacturing sector ranges from an average high near ten
percent in Wisconsin and Indiana, but a low of approximately two percent in Alaska,
Table 1 Summary statistics by percentiles
Min 10th per. 25th per. Median 75th per. 90th per. Max
Employment to population 34.8 40.3 42.6 45 47.7 50 59.6
Government 5.4 6.6 7 7.8 8.4 9.4 13
Financial services 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.4 6.2
Prof./Bus. services 1.6 3.1 3.8 4.8 5.6 6.4 8.4
Construction 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.6 3 5.7
Natural resources 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.1 5.4
Manufacturing 0.9 2.3 3.8 5.4 7.1 8.7 12.5
Education and health 2.7 3.9 4.6 5.4 6.4 7.7 10.3
Leisure and hospitality 2.2 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.5 5.3 15.6
Trade, trans, utilities 6.4 7.7 8.3 9 9.6 10.2 13.3
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Table 2 Employment means by state
State Employ/Pop Gov’t Financial Services Const. Natural Man. Educ. Leisure Trade
AK 44.5 12.1 1.9 3.6 2.3 1.9 2.1 4.4 4.3 9.1
AL 41.6 8.0 2.1 4.0 2.1 0.3 7.3 4.0 3.3 8.2
AR 41.7 7.2 1.8 3.5 1.8 0.3 8.1 4.9 3.2 8.7
AZ 41.0 7.0 2.8 5.5 2.8 0.2 3.6 4.4 4.3 8.1
CA 40.2 6.7 2.4 5.7 1.9 0.1 4.9 4.2 3.9 7.7
CO 47.6 7.9 3.2 6.6 3.0 0.4 3.9 4.6 5.5 9.0
CT 47.7 6.8 4.1 5.7 1.7 0.0 6.6 7.4 3.5 8.9
DE 50.4 7.1 5.5 7.2 2.9 0.0 4.9 6.1 4.5 9.5
FL 41.6 6.2 2.8 4.8 2.8 0.0 2.8 5.2 5.3 9.0
GA 45.1 7.7 2.6 5.5 2.1 0.2 6.0 4.4 4.0 9.7
HI 45.4 9.4 2.4 5.0 2.4 0.0 1.3 5.0 8.0 9.1
IA 48.4 8.2 3.0 3.5 2.1 0.1 7.8 6.3 4.2 10.2
ID 40.7 8.0 2.0 4.4 2.6 0.4 4.8 4.2 3.9 8.5
IL 46.4 6.7 3.2 6.1 2.0 0.1 6.4 5.6 3.9 9.6
IN 46.5 6.7 2.3 3.9 2.2 0.1 9.7 5.6 4.2 9.4
KS 47.4 9.0 2.5 4.5 2.1 0.3 6.8 5.5 3.9 9.6
KY 42.5 7.4 1.9 3.7 1.9 0.6 6.7 5.2 3.7 8.8
LA 41.4 8.2 2.1 3.9 2.7 1.1 3.8 5.1 4.0 8.5
MA 49.8 6.7 3.4 6.8 1.8 0.0 5.8 8.9 4.3 8.9
MD 44.5 8.5 2.7 6.3 2.9 0.0 3.0 5.9 3.9 8.4
ME 44.9 7.7 2.4 3.6 2.1 0.2 5.6 7.5 4.3 9.2
MI 43.2 6.7 2.1 5.5 1.7 0.1 7.6 5.3 3.8 8.1
MN 51.7 8.1 3.3 5.8 2.1 0.1 7.2 7.0 4.5 10.2
MO 46.7 7.4 2.8 5.2 2.2 0.1 6.0 6.0 4.5 9.4
MS 38.8 8.2 1.6 2.7 1.7 0.3 7.2 3.8 3.8 7.6
MT 42.1 9.1 2.0 3.2 2.3 0.8 2.2 5.5 5.4 9.2
NC 45.6 7.7 2.2 4.8 2.5 0.1 8.6 4.8 4.0 8.7
ND 50.4 11.3 2.6 3.4 2.5 0.8 3.4 7.1 4.6 11.3
NE 51.1 9.1 3.5 5.2 2.4 0.0 6.1 6.2 4.3 11.1
NH 47.7 6.8 2.8 4.3 1.9 0.1 7.2 7.0 4.6 10.4
NJ 45.7 7.2 3.0 6.5 1.7 0.0 4.7 5.9 3.6 10.1
NM 40.2 9.9 1.8 4.6 2.5 0.9 2.1 4.7 4.2 7.3
NV 48.3 6.0 2.5 5.2 4.1 0.6 2.0 3.3 13.9 8.7
NY 44.4 7.8 3.8 5.4 1.6 0.0 3.7 7.5 3.4 7.9
OH 46.5 6.8 2.5 5.2 1.9 0.1 7.9 6.2 4.1 9.0
OK 41.7 8.8 2.3 4.3 1.7 1.0 4.5 5.3 3.5 7.9
OR 44.7 7.9 2.7 4.7 2.2 0.3 6.0 5.2 4.2 9.0
PA 44.7 5.9 2.7 4.8 1.9 0.2 6.3 7.7 3.6 8.8
RI 44.8 6.1 2.9 4.7 1.7 0.0 6.5 8.4 4.3 7.4
SC 43.3 7.8 2.1 4.5 2.5 0.1 7.4 3.9 4.4 8.4
SD 48.0 9.5 3.2 2.9 2.5 0.0 5.3 6.8 5.0 9.9
TN 45.3 7.0 2.3 4.7 2.1 0.0 7.9 5.1 4.1 9.8
TX 42.5 7.4 2.6 4.7 2.4 0.8 4.6 4.8 3.8 8.9
UT 45.2 8.2 2.5 5.5 2.8 0.4 5.2 4.8 4.1 9.1
VA 47.0 8.9 2.4 7.2 2.7 0.2 4.6 4.8 4.1 8.6
VT 47.5 8.1 2.1 3.2 2.4 0.2 6.5 7.9 5.2 9.2
WA 43.7 8.2 2.4 4.7 2.5 0.2 5.2 5.0 4.1 8.4
WI 49.8 7.4 2.7 4.3 2.1 0.1 9.8 6.2 4.4 9.6
WV 39.2 7.7 1.6 2.8 1.9 1.5 3.8 5.5 3.4 7.7
WY 48.4 12.4 1.9 2.8 3.7 3.9 1.9 3.8 5.9 9.5
Total 45.1 7.9 2.6 4.7 2.3 0.4 5.5 5.6 4.5 9.0
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Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming. Perhaps the most interesting
sector is employment within government. Alaska, North Dakota, and Wyoming have
nearly 12 percent of their population employed in public administration, whereas Florida,
Nevada, and Pennsylvania have approximately 6 percent of their population employed in
government jobs.
Table 3 presents the results for three panel unit root tests. All three tests offer a slightly
different alternative hypothesis. Perhaps the most popular panel unit root test follows
from Levin et al. (2002) (henceforth LLC). The LLC test follows from the standard aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test applied to an univariate series. The LLC restricts the coefficient
on the lagged dependent variable to be constant across all units of the panel. The alter-
native hypothesis implies that the autoregressive parameter is constant across all panels.
We can see the LLC test confirms the output gap and unemployment series to be sta-
tionary. For robustness we also estimate the unit root tests following Im et al. (2003) and
Choi (2001) (henceforth IPS and Choi). The IPS test differs from the LLC test in that
the IPS test allows the coefficient on the autoregressive parameter to be heterogeneous
across panels. The IPS test has an alternative hypothesis that allows unit roots for some
but not all of the individual panels. In essence the IPS test is based on the augmented
Dickey-Fuller statistics averaged across all panels. We report the mean of the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test statistic (tbar) and the standardized tbar statistic, Zt−bar . Under the IPS
test we can not reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity
Finally, we estimate the panel unit root test following Choi (2001). Choi uses a GLS
detrending method which follows from Elliott et al. (1996) and an error correction model
to specify cross-sectional correlations. Choi reports three test statistics Pm, Z, and L∗
which follow a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis.9 Under the Choi
test we reject the null of non-stationarity at the 1% level of significance for both variables.
4.1 Baseline regressions
We present the results for the baseline panel regressions in Table 4. The first three
columns present the results for Equation 2 using the HP filter method to measure the
output gap. The pooled and state fixed effects models have coefficients that are approxi-
mately equal to Okun’s findings of a three to one relationship. The coefficients of -0.347
and -0.349 shows that for every one percent decrease in the output gap, unemployment
will increase by approximately 0.35%. Once we include both state and quarter fixed effects
the coefficient decreases. The relationship is closer to five to one (a five percent change
Table 3 Unit root tests in panel data
Variable Unemployment Output Gap (HP) Output Gap (Quad.)
LLC (2002) - Adjusted t∗ -8.0438*** -18.6990*** -22.0075***
IPS (2003) - tbar -0.7597 -0.2737 -1.5027
IPS (2003) - Ztbar 6.3896 10.2588 0.1444
Choi (2002) - Pm 9.4451*** 45.9971*** 66.5524***
Choi (2002) - Z -8.2248*** -21.2491*** -27.3692***
Choi (2002) - L* -8.2403*** -28.7373*** -40.6531***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
(t) denotes a trend is included.
LLC: under alternative hypothesis panels are stationary.
IPS: under alternative hypothesis some panels are stationary.
Choi: under alternative hypothesis at least one panel is stationary.
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Table 4 Baseline panel regressions
OLS i-FE i,t-FE OLS i-FE i,t-FE
Yt − Y∗t (HP λ = 1600) -0.347*** -0.349*** -0.191***
(-41.97) (-15.66) (-7.22)
Yt − Y∗t (Quadratic) -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.155***
(-22.89) (-28.51) (-13.25)
Constant 0.0523*** 0.0523*** 0.0573*** 0.0556*** 0.0556*** 0.0580***
(254.23) (245.07) (45.35) (213.40) (5.72e+11) (40.03)
R2 0.446 0.598 0.769 0.159 0.216 0.747
N 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450
t statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
White standard errors.
in the output gap will cause unemployment to change by one percent). Columns four
through six estimate the samemodels but use the output gapmeasure derived as the resid-
ual from the quadratic trend regression. The results from the pool and state fixed effects
models are nearly identical, coefficients of -0.261, and significantly lower than the results
estimated through the HP filter. The results including both state and quarter fixed effects
(column 6) are similar to those presented in column three. Proceeding to estimating the
threshold procedure we elect to use the output gap derived through the HP filter. These
results are more consistent with past literature, the regressions have higher R2 statistics,
and fall closer to Okun’s original findings.
5 Threshold regressions
We present the results for the single and double threshold models in Tables 5 and 6.
In addition to reporting the coefficients from Equation 2 we also report the likelihood
ratio test statistic, p-value, threshold value, and threshold percentile. For example, when
controlling for a single threshold in government employment we find evidence a thresh-
old exists at the 80th percentile. States with government employment less than 8.8% of
the state population will have a coefficient of -0.357, whereas states with employment
in government jobs more than 8.8% of the population will have a coefficient of -0.229.
In the single threshold model we see a similar divergence occur in construction, natural
resources, and leisure. In the other sectors the employment share in the lower thresh-
old regime tends to have the lower coefficient. The effect is largest in the manufacturing
and financial services sectors. In both cases, states with a relatively small employment
share in these sectors tend to have a less sensitive relationship between output gaps and
unemployment.
Since the likelihood ratio test statistic is large and significant at a 1% level for all nine
industries we will spend most of the discussion focused on the double threshold model.
We present the results for the double threshold model in Table 6. All nine industries plus
total employment to population display evidence of two statistically significant thresh-
olds. To better understand the results will also present frequency tables for each state by
regime. The frequency results are presented in Tables 7 and 8.10
5.1 Government employment
Consistent with our hypothesis we find increased employment within the government
sector results in a less sensitive relationship between changes in output and unemploy-










Table 5 Single thresholdmodel - industry employment to population
Baseline Total Gov’t Financial Services Const. Natural Manuf. Education Leisure Trade
Output Gap -0.349***
(-80.82)
qi,t ≤ γ -0.357*** -0.383*** -0.255*** -0.303*** -0.596*** -0.494*** -0.281*** -0.333*** -0.380*** -0.359***
(-80.21) (-83.23) (-29.39) (-44.49) (-50.43) (-64.39) (-48.30) (-69.74) (-78.70) (-74.71)
qit > γ -0.229*** -0.190*** -0.378*** -0.379*** -0.315*** -0.291*** -0.424*** -0.418*** -0.246*** -0.306***
(-11.99) (-18.84) (-78.17) (-69.11) (-72.00) (-60.02) (-69.89) (-42.68) (-27.62) (-28.09)
Constant 0.0523*** 0.0522*** 0.0523*** 0.0523*** 0.0523*** 0.0519*** 0.0521*** 0.0523*** 0.0522*** 0.0522*** 0.0522***
(324.91) (323.77) (335.98) (330.73) (327.69) (337.88) (341.42) (335.44) (326.31) (330.23) (320.63)
R2 0.598 0.601 0.623 0.611 0.604 0.638 0.638 0.622 0.603 0.613 0.599
N 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450
F-stat 41.76 295.8 155.1 75.22 475.2 475.0 281.7 60.30 174.4 19.10
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
γ 49.96 8.801 1.944 4.856 1.647 0.115 3.551 6.653 5.346 9.033
Percentile 0.894 0.807 0.140 0.533 0.108 0.296 0.231 0.785 0.899 0.528
t statistics in parentheses, White standard errors.














Table 6 Double thresholdmodel - industry employment to population
Total Gov’t Financial Services Const. Natural Manuf. Education Leisure Trade
qit ≤ γ1 -0.334*** -0.402*** -0.219*** -0.303*** -0.606*** -0.496*** -0.281*** -0.366*** -0.351*** -0.342***
(-61.66) (-63.56) (-19.19) (-44.66) (-50.45) (-64.17) (-48.47) (-47.32) (-53.77) (-57.81)
γ1 < qit ≤ γ2 -0.477*** -0.362*** -0.350*** -0.363*** -0.378*** -0.316*** -0.454*** -0.247*** -0.416*** -0.432***
(-35.49) (-54.51) (-66.67) (-60.31) (-50.16) (-53.64) (-55.21) (-24.32) (-57.65) (-38.79)
qit > γ2 -0.337*** -0.190*** -0.432*** -0.459*** -0.286*** -0.246*** -0.387*** -0.375*** -0.246*** -0.324***
(-39.92) (-18.86) (-46.76) (-33.18) (-54.25) (-29.57) (-42.84) (-63.25) (-27.79) (-41.66)
Constant 0.0522*** 0.0523*** 0.0523*** 0.0524*** 0.0517*** 0.0522*** 0.0522*** 0.0522*** 0.0522*** 0.0522***
(325.24) (336.73) (332.77) (329.04) (338.82) (343.26) (334.72) (328.22) (331.72) (324.04)
R2 0.607 0.625 0.616 0.608 0.646 0.642 0.625 0.609 0.617 0.604
N 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450 4450
F-Stat 58.78 20.18 54.30 39.85 98.69 46.82 29.59 64.06 44.20 48.52
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
γ1 43.44 7.311 1.896 4.856 1.639 0.109 3.551 5.148 4.080 8.105
γ2 44.61 8.811 2.675 6.120 1.896 0.606 4.921 5.509 5.326 8.571
Percentile1 0.340 0.353 0.115 0.533 0.103 0.276 0.231 0.422 0.449 0.192
Percentile2 0.455 0.809 0.618 0.863 0.285 0.688 0.431 0.539 0.895 0.334
t statistics in parentheses, White standard errors.














Table 7 Frequency by State (Alaska - Mississippi)
Industry Regime β AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS
Total
qit ≤ 43.44 -0.334 28 83 79 81 89 0 0 0 69 15 11 0 89 0 8 0 55 85 0 28 23 44 0 0 89
43.44 < qit ≤ 44.61 -0.477 9 6 10 8 0 11 0 0 20 22 9 12 0 12 7 16 25 4 0 12 8 20 0 11 0
qit > 44.61 -0.337 52 0 0 0 0 78 89 89 0 52 69 77 0 77 74 73 9 0 89 49 58 25 89 78 0
Gov’t
qit ≤ 7.311 -0.402 0 0 61 78 89 0 89 89 89 11 0 0 0 89 89 0 21 0 89 0 0 89 0 26 0
7.311 < qit ≤ 8.811 -0.362 0 89 28 11 0 89 0 0 0 78 0 89 89 0 0 10 68 89 0 89 89 0 89 63 89
qit > 8.811 -0.190 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial
qit ≤ 1.896 -0.219 26 0 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 27 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 89
1.896 < qit ≤ 2.675 -0.350 63 89 0 36 84 0 0 0 15 71 70 18 57 0 89 89 62 86 0 18 76 89 0 16 0
qit > 2.675 -0.432 0 0 0 53 5 89 89 89 74 18 19 71 0 89 0 0 0 0 89 71 13 0 89 73 0
Services
qit ≤ 4.856 -0.303 89 89 89 20 4 0 0 0 33 16 39 89 56 0 89 59 89 89 0 0 89 16 5 18 89
4.856 < qit ≤ 6.120 -0.363 0 0 0 45 60 19 74 5 46 60 50 0 33 33 0 30 0 0 20 30 0 62 53 71 0
qit > 6.120 -0.459 0 0 0 24 25 70 15 84 10 13 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0 69 59 0 11 31 0 0
Const.
qit ≤ 1.639 -0.606 0 0 18 0 30 0 34 0 0 10 0 4 0 10 0 0 9 0 32 0 0 41 0 0 26
1.639 < qit ≤ 1.896 -0.378 13 16 33 10 13 0 38 0 8 12 3 16 6 25 11 23 20 0 19 0 33 20 39 24 38
qit > 1.896 -0.286 76 73 38 79 46 89 17 89 81 67 86 69 83 54 78 66 60 89 38 89 56 28 50 65 25
Natural
qit ≤ 0.109 -0.496 0 0 0 0 81 0 89 0 41 15 0 89 0 65 23 0 0 0 89 0 0 66 5 86 0
0.109 < qit ≤ 0.606 -0.316 0 89 89 89 8 89 0 0 0 74 0 0 85 24 66 89 64 0 0 0 89 23 84 3 89














Table 7 Frequency by State (Alaska - Mississippi) (Continued)
Manuf.
qit ≤ 3.551 -0.281 89 0 0 41 12 37 0 15 83 7 89 0 12 0 0 0 0 33 0 75 0 0 0 0 0
3.551 < qit ≤ 4.921 -0.454 0 0 0 48 29 47 12 28 6 18 0 0 29 13 0 0 10 56 33 14 36 8 0 15 12
qit > 4.921 -0.387 0 89 89 0 48 5 77 46 0 64 0 89 48 76 89 89 79 0 56 0 53 81 89 74 77
Education
qit ≤ 5.148 -0.366 54 89 58 74 89 81 0 9 23 89 53 0 77 21 20 30 43 49 0 16 0 46 0 7 89
5.148 < qit ≤ 5.509 -0.247 17 0 19 15 0 8 0 13 47 0 26 8 12 24 26 12 10 15 0 13 4 11 3 7 0
qit > 5.509 -0.375 18 0 12 0 0 0 89 67 19 0 10 81 0 44 43 47 36 25 89 60 85 32 86 75 0
Leisure
qit ≤ 4.080 -0.351 29 89 89 12 71 0 89 10 0 52 0 22 82 74 22 73 89 32 23 79 24 89 0 13 47
4.080 < qit ≤ 5.326 -0.416 60 0 0 77 18 27 0 79 60 37 0 67 7 15 67 16 0 57 66 10 65 0 89 76 42
qit > 5.326 -0.246 0 0 0 0 0 62 0 0 29 0 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trade
qit ≤ 8.105 -0.342 0 28 7 36 89 11 3 0 12 0 9 0 12 0 0 0 0 6 0 14 0 43 0 0 89
8.105 < qit ≤ 8.571 -0.432 15 44 26 46 0 3 10 12 0 12 9 0 32 0 12 0 31 52 16 41 5 29 0 8 0














Table 8 Frequency by State (Montana - Wyoming)
Industry Regime β MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY
Total
qit ≤ 43.44 -0.334 67 13 10 0 3 0 89 12 14 0 75 25 18 12 42 12 13 68 28 0 0 43 0 89 0
43.44 < qit ≤ 44.61 -0.477 9 13 4 0 7 22 0 0 38 23 14 13 19 24 27 3 10 12 4 6 10 21 0 0 15
qit > 44.61 -0.337 13 63 75 89 79 67 0 77 37 66 0 51 52 53 20 74 66 9 57 83 79 25 89 0 74
Gov’t
qit ≤ 7.311 -0.402 0 0 0 0 84 56 0 89 0 89 0 0 89 89 5 0 89 29 0 0 0 0 25 15 0
7.311 < qit ≤ 8.811 -0.362 10 89 0 0 5 33 0 0 89 0 55 89 0 0 84 0 0 60 89 55 89 89 64 74 0
qit > 8.811 -0.190 79 0 89 89 0 0 89 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 0 89
Financial
qit ≤ 1.896 -0.219 27 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 48
1.896 < qit ≤ 2.675 -0.350 62 89 43 0 27 0 9 73 0 62 89 30 34 30 89 24 89 69 55 89 89 89 32 0 41
qit > 2.675 -0.432 0 0 46 89 62 89 0 16 89 27 0 59 55 59 0 65 0 20 34 0 0 0 57 0 0
Services
qit ≤ 4.856 -0.303 89 32 89 22 73 0 73 19 23 23 80 41 36 50 69 89 42 38 19 0 89 55 74 89 89
4.856 < qit ≤ 6.120 -0.363 0 57 0 67 16 26 16 67 66 66 9 48 53 39 20 0 47 51 64 19 0 34 15 0 0
qit > 6.120 -0.459 0 0 0 0 0 63 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 70 0 0 0 0 0
Const.
qit ≤ 1.639 -0.606 14 0 6 0 19 37 0 0 42 21 33 0 4 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 14 0
1.639 < qit ≤ 1.896 -0.378 9 9 9 11 25 29 0 0 47 20 40 26 42 25 11 0 18 0 10 0 0 0 21 40 0
qit > 1.896 -0.286 66 80 74 78 45 23 89 89 0 48 16 63 43 22 78 89 71 89 79 89 89 89 62 35 89
Natural
qit ≤ 0.109 -0.496 0 56 0 0 89 89 0 0 89 39 0 0 0 89 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 89 0 0
0.109 < qit ≤ 0.606 -0.316 0 33 61 0 0 0 0 50 0 50 0 89 89 0 63 0 0 0 89 89 89 76 0 0 0
qit > 0.606 -0.246 89 0 28 89 0 0 89 39 0 0 89 0 0 0 0 89 89 89 0 0 0 0 0 89 89
Manuf.
qit ≤ 3.551 -0.281 89 0 47 0 0 18 89 89 41 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 18 0 0 0 34 89
3.551 < qit ≤ 4.921 -0.454 0 12 42 0 0 27 0 0 40 0 55 13 13 22 12 22 11 32 40 26 7 41 0 55 0














Table 8 Frequency by State (Montana - Wyoming) (Continued)
Education
qit ≤ 5.148 -0.366 32 55 0 16 0 17 52 89 0 8 27 48 0 0 89 0 50 66 61 62 0 59 10 30 89
5.148 < qit ≤ 5.509 -0.247 15 12 0 10 0 11 16 0 0 10 28 17 0 0 0 9 14 21 18 9 0 16 14 11 0
qit > 5.509 -0.375 42 22 89 63 89 61 21 0 89 71 34 24 89 89 0 80 25 2 10 18 89 14 65 48 0
Leisure
qit ≤ 4.080 -0.351 0 54 12 13 12 89 25 0 89 28 89 22 89 28 18 0 32 82 32 28 0 46 10 89 0
4.080 < qit ≤ 5.326 -0.416 23 35 77 76 77 0 64 0 0 61 0 67 0 61 71 73 57 7 57 61 55 43 79 0 9
qit > 5.326 -0.246 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 80
Trade
qit ≤ 8.105 -0.342 0 14 0 0 0 0 89 12 77 0 61 10 0 89 22 0 0 5 0 13 0 13 0 89 0
8.105 < qit ≤ 8.571 -0.432 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 15 8 14 28 3 23 0 37 0 0 8 11 14 3 45 0 0 0
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occur at the 35th and 81st percentiles with employment ratios of 7.3 and 8.8% of total
state population, respectively. The coefficient is lowest (-0.190) for states with govern-
ment employment rates above the 81st percentile. We can use the frequency tables to
better understand which states appear in this regime. The states with a relatively large
share of government employment are Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota,
Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming. It is worth point out that many of
these states also have relatively larger employment shares within the natural resources and
mining sector. The coefficient is highest, implying a more sensitive relationship between
output and unemployment for states with the smallest share of employment within the
government sector. The states with the majority of their observations appearing in the
lowest regime include Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. Unlike the high government employment
regime there does not appear to be a common link connecting the low employment states.
The magnitude of the differences in the coefficients is striking. For the high employ-
ment regime the coefficient is -0.190 but nearly double for the low employment regime.
This suggests states with a relatively large employment share within government services
experience smaller shocks to unemployment following from cyclical fluctuations in the
business cycle. For these states tt will take approximately a five percent change in out-
put for unemployment to change by one percent. The coefficient for the low employment
regime is significantly higher in absolute value, -0.402. The coefficient for the low employ-
ment regime is more than double which suggests a much more sensitive relationship.
For these states, every 2.5 percent change in output relates to a one percent change in
unemployment.
5.2 Financial services
Increased employment within the financial sector results in a more sensitive relation-
ship between output and unemployment. The recent business cycle fluctuations have
largely been driven by asset price volatility which we suspect to be a key factor behind
these results. This sector includes employment within financial intermediaries includ-
ing insurance companies and real estate. We find evidence of two statistically significant
thresholds within financial employment. The thresholds occur at the 11th and 61st
percentiles, with employment shares of 1.9 and 2.7% of the population. Over time,
states having consistently large employment shares within the financial sector include:
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Illinois, Maryland,Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, and New York. Okun’s coefficient for these states is -0.432. States
with a relatively small employment share within the financial sector have a coefficient
half as large at -0.219. These states include: Arkansas, Mississippi, NewMexico, andWest
Virginia.
5.3 Professional and Business Services
We expect states with a relatively large share of employment within service sectors to
have a more sensitive relationship between output and unemployment. Many service jobs
tend to be pro-cyclical, these would include employment with legal services, accounting,
architectural, scientific research and development, and administrative services. We find
evidence of two thresholds at the 53rd and 86th percentiles with employment shares of 4.8
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and 6.1%. Okun’s coefficient is increasing as employment within service sectors increases.
The coefficient is lowest (-0.303) for states with a relatively small share of employment
in services. These states include: Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Although we find the coefficient to be statistically different, it is
worth noting the coefficient does not vary greatly across the three regimes.
In the high service employment regime the coefficient increases to -0.459, approxi-
mately 50% greater than the coefficient found for the low employment regime. States with
relatively high service employment include Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, New
Jersey, and Virginia.
5.4 Construction
Contrary to our hypothesis, increased employment within the construction industry
resulted in a less sensitive relationship between output and unemployment. Given the
majority of the data are prior to the Great Recession this result is relatively consistent.
Construction employment had been relative noncyclical until the housing collapse in
2008. We find evidence of two thresholds occurring at the 10th and 28th percentiles
with employment shares of 1.6 and 1.9%. Given the relatively low threshold percentiles
the key result only applies to states with an extremely small construction share of
employment. Most of the observations in the low employment regime occur from 1990
through 1993 and 2011 through 2012.11 States with relatively low construction employ-
ment in the later period include: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, NewHampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. For these states the coefficient is relatively high
at -0.606.
The more sensitivity result is likely stemming from large layoffs within the construc-
tion industry in the years prior to appearing in the low regime sample. Although a large
number of observations in the low regime occur in 2011 many of these states had larger
employment shares from 2000 through 2008. For example, California had an employ-
ment to population share in excess of 2.5% prior to 2009. In 2009 the employment share
dropped to approximately 1.80% and thereafter fell further to 1.5%. For many states, large
decreases of employment within the construction industry are driving the more sensitive
relationship and higher unemployment rates following the global financial crisis.
5.5 Natural resources andmining
Some of the more interesting results come when we estimate thresholds within natural
resources and mining. A priori we do not have a strong suspicion over the magnitude
of the coefficients. We find evidence of two thresholds occurring at the 28th and 69th
percentiles with employment shares of 0.10 and 0.60 percent. The relationship becomes
less sensitive as employment increases in natural resource sectors. Overall, the share
of employment within the natural resource sectors is relatively small but nonetheless
explains a large variation in Okun’s coefficient. States with a large employment share
have a coefficient of -0.246. These states include: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana,
Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas,West Virginia, andWyoming. Interestingly, many of these states also have relatively
large employment shares within the government sector.
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States within the low employment regime include: California, Colorado, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.
These states have a coefficient of -0.496. It is important to note that many of these states
also have high employment in other sectors that also correspond with a more sensitive
relationship, mainly the financial and construction sectors.
5.6 Manufacturing
Manufacturing employment been in the spotlight of our economic recovery. The high
unemployment rates for many states throughout the midwest is result of large declines in
manufacturing employment over the last fifteen years. As expected we find the relation-
ship is more sensitive for states with employment in the middle and high employment
regimes. We find evidence of two regimes at the 23rd and 43rd percentiles with employ-
ment shares of 3.5 and 4.9% of the population. The coefficient is highest, -0.454, for the
middle regime, but not greatly different than the pooled estimate of -0.35. The coeffi-
cient decreases to -0.387 for the high employment regime. Despite the recent struggles
of the states heavily dependent on manufacturing employment this does not appear to be
driving a more sensitive relationship between output and unemployment.
For many states, the decline in manufacturing has been a continual problem since the
late 1990s and despite the high unemployment rates throughout Michigan, Wisconsin,
Indiana, Ohio, and Minnesota they do not appear to be caused by a decline in manu-
facturing employment. As employment in manufacturing declined throughout the early
2000s, many ex-manufacturing workers were able to find employment within construc-
tion and service sectors. The higher unemployment rates, which in this case do not
correlate with a more sensitive relationship, are likely the result of job losses in these lat-
ter sectors. Another possible explanation lies within the context of wage contracts. Many
manufacturing sectors are protected through employment protection causes in union
contracts.
States in the low employment regime have a significantly lower coefficient of -0.281.
These states include: Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, and
Wyoming. Many of these states were also in the high government and natural resource
employment shares. We cannot conclude if the less sensitive relationship is the result
of lower employment in manufacturing or higher employment in government and natu-
ral resources. We can conclude that states with lower manufacturing shares have a less
sensitive output to unemployment relationship, but the reverse does not apply. States
with large shares of employment within manufacturing sectors do not have a signifi-
cantly more sensitive relationship when compared to Okun’s coefficient pooled across
states.
5.7 Education and health services
We hypothesize that education and health services will have a more sensitive relationship
associated with states that have a smaller employment share. During recessions many
states are forced to layoff workers within this sector. We find evidence of two thresholds
which occur at the 42nd and 54th percentiles with employment shares of 5.1 and 5.6%
of the population. States in the middle regime have a less sensitive relationship (-0.247)
relative to the low and high regimes. The latter two have coefficients that are consistent
with the pooled estimate, -0.366 and -0.375, respectively. Given the overall small number
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of observations within the middle regime we don’t suspect employment within education
and health services to have a large economic impact on the coefficient.
5.8 Leisure and hospitality
Leisure and hospitality sectors are highly cyclical, for that reason we hypothesize that
increased employment within these sectors would result in a more sensitive relationship.
We find evidence of two thresholds occurring at the 45th and 90th percentiles. Interest-
ingly the high employment regime also has the most insensitive relationship. States in this
grouping include: Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming. These
states have a coefficient of -0.246 which is considerably lower than the pooled estimate.
5.9 Trade, transportation, and utility
The last employment sector that we analyze is a collection of many different industries
including: retail and wholesale trade, transportation, and utilities. Given the emphasis on
wholesale and retail production, we expect the relationship to becomemore sensitive with
increased employment in these sectors. We find evidence of two thresholds occurring at
the 19th and 33rd percentiles, but overall the coefficients do not vary largely across these
thresholds. The low and high regimes have coefficients of -0.342 and -0.324, respectively.
These are consistent with the pooled sample. The middle regime has a slightly higher
coefficient of -0.432.
5.10 Industry thresholds and recessions
In addition to understanding the relationship between Okun’s coefficient and industry
employment levels we are also interested in understanding how sector level employment
affects unemployment rates following a recession. We use our results from the double
threshold model and incorporate a recession dummy variable, Dt−i that takes a value of
one in the ith quarter of the recession and zero otherwise. We use the NBER dating of
the business cycle to determine the end of each recession (1991q1, 2001q4, and 2009q2).
We include the dummy variable with eight lags to measure how unemployment responds
given a state has an employment level in a particular threshold regime. The inclusion of
eight lags allows us to measure unemployment a full two years after the official end of a
recession.
The results for each industry are presented Table 9. The first row estimates the
baseline regression with the included recession dummy variable. Okun’s coefficient
remains unchanged and on average shows a very slow response to unemployment
rates following the recession. As the economy recovers unemployment will decrease
in accordance with Okun’s coefficient but the dummy variables show a shift up in the
baseline unemployment, the constant term. In the next set of rows are the results bro-
ken down by industry regimes. There are three sets of results for each industry. These
results correspond to the three unique regimes found through the double threshold
model. Using three sets of regressions also allows us to measure a unique constant
term for each regime. The constant term can be interpreted as the natural rate of
unemployment.
One interesting result is that many of the industries show an increase in unemployment
following the end of the recession. Partly this is a result of using a national business cycle










Table 9 Double thresholdmodel with regression dummy variables
Industry Regime U∗ β Dt−1 Dt−2 Dt−3 Dt−4 Dt−5 Dt−6 Dt−7 Dt−8
Baseline 0.0502 -0.3305 0.0057 0.0049 0.0043 0.0063 0.0064 0.0061 0.0053 0.0043
Gov’t
qit ≤ 7.311 0.0533 -0.3848 0.0037 0.0035 0.0033 0.0064 0.0064 0.0062 0.006 0.0053
7.311 < qit ≤ 8.811 0.0504 -0.339 0.0072 0.0059 0.0052 0.0057 0.0059 0.0063 0.0043 0.0033
qit > 8.811 0.0446 -0.1691 0.0047 0.0045 0.0039 0.0053 0.0054 0.0051 0.0044 0.0028
Financial
qit ≤ 1.896 0.0583 -0.1789 0.0031 0.0041 0.0051 0.0105 0.0102 0.011 0.0081 0.0065
1.896 < qit ≤ 2.675 0.0513 -0.3227 0.0079 0.0065 0.0056 0.0057 0.0062 0.0058 0.0055 0.0042
qit > 2.675 0.0473 -0.4458 0.0023 0.0014 0.0007 0.0025 0.003 0.0022 0.0021 0.0018
Services
qit ≤ 4.856 0.0505 -0.2749 0.0066 0.0052 0.005 0.0069 0.0075 0.0072 0.0061 0.005
4.856 < qit ≤ 6.120 0.052 -0.3529 0.0068 0.006 0.0047 0.0048 0.0044 0.004 0.0036 0.0027
qit > 6.120 0.0466 -0.4481 0.0043 0.0036 0.0034 0.0024 0.0007 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0007
Const.
qit ≤ 1.639 0.0633 -0.4444 0.0032 0.0054 0.0049 0.0063 0.007 0.0087 0.0072 0.0068
1.639 < qit ≤ 1.896 0.0547 -0.3378 0.0085 0.0047 0.0042 0.003 0.0031 0.002 0.001 -0.0002
qit > 1.896 0.0479 -0.2712 0.0055 0.0043 0.003 0.0041 0.0043 0.0041 0.0038 0.0026
Natural
qit ≤ 0.109 0.0534 -0.4931 0.0022 0.0014 0.0007 0.0027 0.0022 0.0031 0.0029 0.0024
0.109 < qit ≤ 0.606 0.049 -0.2985 0.0061 0.0054 0.0049 0.0068 0.0071 0.0066 0.0059 0.0046














Table 9 Double thresholdmodel with regression dummy variables (Continued)
Manuf.
qit ≤ 3.551 0.0516 -0.2605 0.0059 0.0053 0.0047 0.0058 0.0056 0.0052 0.0037 0.002
3.551 < qit ≤ 4.921 0.0541 -0.3312 0.0057 0.0053 0.005 0.0062 0.0056 0.0047 0.0035 0.0033
qit > 4.921 0.0493 -0.3935 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0004 0.004 0.0046 0.0047 0.005 0.0045
Education
qit ≤ 5.148 0.0532 -0.3447 0.0056 0.0051 0.0043 0.0069 0.0077 0.0074 0.0062 0.0052
5.148 < qit ≤ 5.509 0.0487 -0.2433 0.0097 0.0076 0.0054 0.0048 0.0053 0.0058 0.0056 0.0038
qit > 5.509 0.0483 -0.3704 0.0044 0.0035 0.0028 0.0042 0.0037 0.0037 0.0034 0.0025
Leisure
qit ≤ 4.080 0.0539 -0.3393 0.0065 0.0062 0.0062 0.008 0.0082 0.0078 0.0068 0.0059
4.080 < qit ≤ 5.326 0.0484 -0.4138 0.0034 0.0024 0.0015 0.002 0.0023 0.0021 0.0018 0.0012
qit > 5.326 0.045 -0.2561 0.0032 0.0018 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0028
Trade
qit ≤ 8.105 0.0594 -0.3223 0.0068 0.0065 0.0061 0.0072 0.0071 0.0068 0.0053 0.0037
8.105 < qit ≤ 8.571 0.0569 -0.2743 0.0031 0.0026 0.0031 0.0044 0.0042 0.0036 0.003 0.0025
qit > 8.571 0.0469 -0.307 0.0042 0.0036 0.0022 0.0042 0.0048 0.0048 0.0042 0.0035
White standard errors are used.
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cycle relative to the national economy. Even still, this result is not surprising. Looking at
the United States as a whole the NBER dated the end of the recession in 2009q2. The
national unemployment rate during 2009q2 averaged 9.3% but continued to increase and
peaked at 10% in 2009q4. This pattern is similar for the other recessions observed in the
data. Nonetheless the inclusion of the lagged dummy variable will capture the increase in
unemployment rates following the “official” end of the recession.
Perhaps the most interesting case if for government employment levels. States with
a smaller share of government employment not only have a more sensitive relationship
to changes in output but also have significantly higher unemployment rates than states
with a larger share of government workers. After eight quarters following a recession
states with a relatively larger share of professional service, financial services, construction,
and government employment were likely to have lower unemployment rates. Addition-
ally, states with a smaller share of employment in natural resources and manufacturing
had significantly lower unemployment rates in the eight quarters following the end of a
recession.
The most extreme differences appear in the financial, professional services, and con-
struction sectors. States with a relatively large share of employment within financial and
professional services tend to have a more sensitive relationship to changes in the out-
put gap but this also shows up as a lower natural rate and a much quicker recovery
following the end of the recession. Both of these industries tend to be free of labor mar-
ket rigidities which helps to explain the speed at which unemployment decreases. States
with a relatively low measure of construction employment have a higher natural rate and
Okun’s coefficient but a slower recovery captured by the relatively high coefficients on the
dummy variables.
Another interesting case emerges for states with relatively larger employment shares
withinmanufacturing. These states have a higher Okun’s coefficient but following a reces-
sion unemployment rates are relatively flat but increase drastically in months five through
eight. One explanation could be the existence of labor unions that fight to keep workers
employed longer where as many service workers are at will employees and can have jobs
terminated earlier during the recession.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that Okun’s Law largely depends on the overall employment make-
up for each state. States with a less sensitive relationship between unemployment and
output have a larger share of employment within government, natural resources and min-
ing, construction, and leisure and hospitality with lower employment shares in financial
services, professional and business services, and manufacturing. The coefficient across
the pooled sample is consistent with Okun’s original findings of a three-to-one relation-
ship between changes in the output gap and unemployment. We find the relationship
weakens to a five-to-one relationship for states with relatively large employment within
government and natural resource sectors. The relationship strengthens to a nearly two-
to-one relationship for states with relatively smaller employment within government and
construction sectors, and larger employment within financial and professional services.
There is evidence that time period does matter. We find that many of the regimes not
only relate to employment share by sector but also specific time periods. This was seen
especially in the estimates for the construction sectors. Most of the low regime, highly
2013, 2:17
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/17
Herzog IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 25 of 26
sensitive results came through states following the housing collapse from 2010 through
2012.
In the broader scope of the literature these results can be seen as a way to further
understand the dynamics between cyclical fluctuations in the business cycle and unem-
ployment rates. As many researchers are focusing on productivity gains to explain the
recent divergence in Okun’s coefficient we find considerable evidence to suggest that the
overall construction of a state’s labor market is equally important.
Endnotes
1 See Mankiw (2010), Romer (2006), or Abel et al. (2008) for textbook examples.
2 For a summary of estimating the natural rate of unemployment see Weidner and
Williams (2011).
3 Because of the negative relationship, throughout the paper we will refer to the
coefficient as an absolute value. An increase in absolute value of the coefficient, implies
for a given change in the output gap, unemployment will change by a larger amount.
4 For robustness we also use λ = 16, 000. These results are available upon request.
5 For robustness we have also estimated the results assuming a constant trend of 2%,
2.25%, 2.75%, and 3% from 2008 through 2012 and are quantitatively similar to those
presented below.
6 The results are consistent when trimming by 5% or 15%.
7 Under total observations of N and a minimum π ∗ N observations in the threshold
grouping would require estimating 2 × π × N regressions for a single threshold model.
In the case of N = 4600 we estimate 3,680 regressions under the single threshold
procedure. The double threshold model requires a greater need for computing power.
The total number of regressions estimated for the double threshold model equals:∑(1−3π)N
i=1 i, for the case of N = 700 the double threshold model requires estimating
5,185,810 regressions.
8 See Hansen (1999) for complete details of the threshold procedure and test statistics.
Graphs of confidence intervals are available upon request.
9 For details of all three unit root tests we suggest reading Maddala and Kim (1998).
10 For robustness we estimated the threshold models using the lag of the employment
variables. The results are nearly identical to those reported here and can be provided
upon request.
11 Time frequency charts are available upon request.
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